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ABSTRACT 
In 2014, to improve upon the existing scheme, the Punjab government launched a “new wheat -pulses scheme” 
under the public distribution system. The state decided to distribute grains on a six-monthly basis instead of every 
month. It claimed various benefits, whereas beneficiaries expressed concerns. The purpose of this research was to 
identify and understand factors affecting beneficiaries’ preference for successful adoption of a biannual or six-
monthly distribution system. Factors affecting beneficiaries’ preference included monthly hassle, leakages in 
system, storage challenges, interval of grain distribution, one-time down payment, trade of bulk grains by family, 
exploitation by middle-men, communication of arrival of grains, gender, area, and nature of employment.  
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1 Introduction 
There are 795 million food insecure people worldwide, and 98 percent of them are in developing 
countries like India (FAO, 2015). To support its below poverty line (BPL) citizens, the federal government, 
along with different state governments in India, run a public distribution system (PDS) (Kishore & 
Chakrabarti, 2015). With PDSs, an estimated 160 million beneficiary households purchase their subsidized 
monthly entitlement of food grains and other essential commodities through a network of 500,000 fair 
price shops (FPSs) (Ministry of Consumer Affairs, Food & Public Distribution, 2011). But the efficacy of a 
PDS as an enabler of food security has been hampered by various malpractices such as leakages, black  
marketing, and adulteration (Balani, 2013; Rajan et al., 2016). As a result, many states in India have tried 
to address these issues through different technological interventions and supply chain strategies such as 
digitization of transactions in Chhattisgarh and Madhya Pradesh and a universal PDS in Tamil Nadu 
(Balani, 2013). 
The Indian state of Punjab, which contributes 43 percent of total wheat to the central pool (Economic & 
Statistical Organization, 2013), has been at forefront of PDS transformations. In 2014, building upon 
provisions of the National Food Security Act (NFSA) 2013, the Punjab government modified its existing 
PDS structure by launching the new atta-daal (wheat-pulses) scheme
1
 (Dept. of Food Civil Supplies & 
Consumer Affairs, 2014b). Some of the prominent features of the scheme include that (a) the eldest 
woman is considered head of family, (b) eligible beneficiaries are identified on the basis of a unique 
identification number, (c) wheat is distributed at $0.03 per kg, (d) every household member gets 5 kg of 
wheat per month without any upper cap, (e) unsatisfied beneficiaries can go to a consumer court, and (f) 
the entitlement of wheat is given to beneficiaries on a biannual or six-monthly basis. Specifically, the 
requirements of the biannual distribution system (hereafter referred to as six-monthly distribution 
system) overhauled the existing method of storage and distribution of  wheat grains.
2
 Particular 
requirements of six-monthly distribution system include that (6a) the distribution of grains is conducted 
under the direct supervision of Department of Food Civil Supplies & Consumer Affairs and (6b) the wheat 
is distributed in 30-kg sealed bags equivalent to the six-month entitlement of the beneficiary (Dept. of 
Food Civil Supplies & Consumer Affairs, 2014b). 
As illustrated in Fig. 1, prior to the six-monthly distribution system, farmers used to bring their produce to 
state-established markets, where commission agents facilitated the sale of wheat grains to procurement 
agencies. The state agencies, on behalf of central government, procured wheat from approximately 1,750 
markets across Punjab and stored it (Economic & Statistical Organization, 2013). The central government 
released the state entitlement for the monthly requirement through the Food Corporation of India (FCI). 
These stocks were transported to FPSs, where beneficiaries would buy wheat on a monthly basis. With a 
six-monthly or biannual distribution system, instead of storing wheat in state agency warehouses for the 
long term, it is now packed in 30-kg bags and delivered to end users twice a year immediately after 
procurement (Puri, 2014) under the direct supervision of food inspectors.  
Despite several implementation challenges with the six-monthly distributions system, the state government 
and policymakers claimed numerous benefits for administration and beneficiaries alike (see Table 1). In spite 
of these claimed benefits, exploratory field visits by the authors suggested several concerns by beneficiaries 
regarding the new scheme (see Table 4). 
                                                 
1
 The state government received criticism for the scheme from several stakeholders. Many believed this to be 
a populist measure driven by upcoming state elections, and others thought that it would be a financial burden 
(Sharma, 2016), whereas the state government believed it would be beneficial (Puri, 2014). The authors do not 
endorse either the state government or other stakeholder views. This is an independent attempt to 
understand beneficiaries’ perception regarding change in such policies. 
2
Although black grams (pulses) are an integral part of the new the atta-daal (wheat-pulses) scheme, there is no 
explicit mention of that in the provisions; therefore, the authors focus only on the wheat supply chain. 
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a 
The state of Punjab follows decentralized procurement for wheat under NFSA obligations (Food Corporation 
of India, 2016) 
b 
This flow chart is based on the data collected during authors’ field visit in August 2015. Since then, this policy 
has undergone some progressive changes based on stakeholders’ feedback; the role of some stakeholders and 
rates/quantities are subject to change 
 
Figure 1. Schematic flow of wheat grains through the old and new atta-daal (wheat-pulses) schemes 
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Table 1. 
Benefits of six-monthly distribution system as claimed by policymakers and the literature 
Benefits Definition Source of claim 
Quantity (↑) Distribution of accurate amount of grains, decreasing 
weighing malpractices with sealed bags containing pre-
packaged grains as per entitlement  
State government 
(Tribune News Service, 
2015) 
Quality (↑) Distribution of fresh grains (not rotten), of superior standards 
in sealed bags to ensure no adulteration 
 
State government 
(Tribune News Service, 
2015) 
Hassle (↓) Distribution of grains once every six months versus once a 
month, saving consumers time and energy from engaging with 
PDS frequently 
 
Kumar (2015) 
Consumer  
empowerment 
(↑) 
Beneficiary exercises complete control and independence 
over food grains, improving utilization and reduced 
dependence on FPS 
 
State government 
(Tribune News Service, 
2015) 
Delivery  
mechanism (↑) 
Distribution in front of community under direct supervision of 
food inspectors to intended beneficiary, leading to continuous 
evaluation and monitoring  
 
Dept. of Food Civil 
Supplies & Consumer 
Affairs (2014b) 
Leakages (↓) Decrease in siphoning of food grains during transportation to 
ration shops in open markets 
 
Gaikwad (2010); Puri 
(2014) 
 
PDS  
performance (↑) 
Increased purchase–entitlement ratio (PER), i.e. proportion of 
grains that the household is entitled to against actually 
purchased; a higher PER suggests that PDS delivers better 
 
Dept. of Food Civil 
Supplies & Consumer 
Affairs (2014b) 
State  
expenditure (↓) 
 
Decrease in transportation, storage, and preservation cost for 
state government resulting in savings
a
 
 
Puri (2014) 
Logistical 
complexity(↓) 
 
Simplified logistical movement of grains from markets to 
beneficiaries, making it more manageable 
Puri (2014) 
Grain wastage 
(↓) 
Decrease in storage time at government warehouses and less 
handling of grains resulting in reduced wastage 
 
Puri (2014) 
a 
According to an estimate state government, successful implementation of six-monthly system could save $25.4 million 
p.a. (Puri, 2014). 
 
Furthermore, it has been observed in literature that policy adoption and preference of beneficiaries is 
affected by various environmental, socioeconomic, and demographic factors (Kabir et al., 2013). Khera 
(2014) studied the impact of cash transfer instead of in-kind subsidies on beneficiaries for PDSs in India. 
She classified factors affecting beneficiaries’ preference into two categories : direct and indirect factors. 
Direct factors include (a) insecurities arising from lack of trust in the existing system, (b) concerns with 
the efficiency of the proposed system, (c) lack of familiarity with the proposed interventions, (d) concerns 
with food security, (e) misuse of resources, and (f) ease of interactions within the system, and indirect 
factors include (a) education, (b) age, (c) gender, (d) caste, (e) employment, and (f) standard of living.  
Tey et al. (2014) highlighted various systemic factors affecting the preference of beneficiaries for such 
policies. They proposed an integrative framework based on the theory of interpersonal behavior, 
suggesting that expectations, insecurities, and existing social norms affect intentions and perceived 
preference behavior. Additionally they proposed that perceived attributes, such as relative advantages, 
disadvantages, and complexity, also affect beneficiaries’ preferences. Meanwhile, Namara et al. (2007) 
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highlighted the role of institutional factors, such as trainings, participation in institutional arrangements, 
and social organizations, in influencing beneficiaries’ preferences. Namara et al. (2007) further grouped 
several factors into various categories, namely, demographic structure (family size, head of family, age of 
family members, gender distribution), human capital variables (age, education, employment), existing 
resources, and other socioeconomic variables (caste, social status, poverty index).  
Jain and Polman (2003) elaborated on the importance of benefic iaries’ roles in effective policy 
implementation. They suggested that marginalized beneficiaries can be empowered by involving them in 
the planning and implementation of schemes that affect them directly. Their participation and feedback 
help in addressing concerns affecting their daily lives, which in turn help them appreciate the macro level 
constraints in policymaking. Lack of involvement of these critical stakeholder have often resulted in 
marginalization of several sections of rural poor, resulting in ineffective implementation of development 
programs (Jain & Polman, 2003). Therefore, understanding the importance of the role of beneficiaries, 
through this research the authors attempted to understand beneficiaries’ perspective and feedback.  
Because beneficiaries’ inputs are essential and various factors affect their preferences, the purpose of 
this research was to identify and understand those factors. Further, these identified factors will help 
policymakers and researchers address beneficiaries’ concerns  about effective implementation and 
provide critical indicators for evaluation of the scheme. Moreover, Punjab is one of the first states to 
implement the six-monthly distribution system (Puri, 2014), so a better understanding of the 
beneficiaries’ perspective will help extend the learning to other states. Also, there is limited or no 
research on policy preferences of beneficiaries for extended intervals of grain distribution. Accordingly, 
the authors attempt to fill the gap in the literature to understand beneficiaries’ preference by developing 
logistic regression models.  
2 Methodology 
This research was conducted in two stages: the first stage was an exploratory study, and the second stage 
was survey dissemination (see Fig. 2). The exploratory research helped authors gather preliminary 
information, define the research problem, formulate the research design, and finalize the data collection 
method (Stebbins, 2001). The authors conducted field visits, guided conversations, semi-structured 
interviews, and focus group discussions with several stakeholders in their natural settings. In the second 
stage, using snowball sampling, the authors conducted a survey among 300 household across several 
socioeconomic backgrounds in 14 different villages and localities in the district of Ludhiana . The survey 
provided primary data for further analysis. Three different logistic regression models were developed 
with facilitating, impeding, and demographic variables, respectively. This helped identify factors affecting 
beneficiaries’ preference for the six-monthly distribution system.  
 
 
Figure 2. Methodological flow and timeline of the research study 
2.1 Exploratory Research 
After six months of preliminary study of existing literature, the authors visited Punjab from July to 
August, 2015. They spent over 40 days in the field conducting exploratory research in three districts of 
Punjab—Amritsar, Jalandhar, and Ludhiana—which were selected based on the number of FPSs and the 
volume of beneficiaries served (Economic & Statistical Organization, 2013). Authors coded the data, and 
emergent codes were grouped into three common themes, based on their underlying similarity: 
impeding, facilitating, and demographic factors (Grover et al., 2016). These themes were later used to 
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design a survey and identify variables for logistic regression models. The exploratory part of the study 
helped the authors understand the PDS supply chain, identify different stakeholders , and define the 
research problem (see Fig. 2) (Stebbins, 2001). The different stakeholders, the type of data collected from 
each stakeholder, and the number of members interviewed, along with time duration are outlined in 
Table 2. 
Table 2. 
Stakeholders, type of data, duration, and technique used 
a 
Participant consent was obtained before taking photographs, video, or audio recordings; the recordings were focused on 
the processes rather than the individuals. 
Stakeholders Participant 
count 
Type of data Duration of 
data collection 
(hours) 
Meeting 
place 
Techniques used 
Beneficiary 11 Field notes, 
minutes of 
meeting 
15 Villages, FPS 
(Amritsar, 
Ludhiana) 
Focus group 
discussion, semi-
structured interview 
 
Fair price shop (FPS) 5 Field notes, 
minutes of 
meeting, 
video,
a
 
photograph
a
 
 
9 FPS 
(Ludhiana, 
Jalandhar) 
Semi-structured 
interview, participant 
observation 
Dept. of Food Civil 
Supplies & Consumer 
Affair 
 
3 Field notes, 
minutes of 
meeting 
8 Office 
(Chandigarh) 
Semi-structured 
interview, guided 
conversation 
Dept. of Agriculture, 
Punjab 
2 Field notes, 
minutes of 
meeting 
3 Office 
(Chandigarh) 
Semi-structured 
interview, guided 
conversation 
 
Food Corporation of 
India (FCI) 
10 Field notes, 
minutes of 
meeting 
9 FCI office 
(Amritsar, 
Ludhiana) 
Focus group 
discussion, semi-
structured interview 
 
Policy scientists 3 Field notes, 
minutes of 
meeting 
 
7 Office 
(Ludhiana) 
Semi-structured 
interview 
Ground staff 
(technical, 
nontechnical) 
6 Field notes, 
minutes of 
meeting, video
a
 
4 Office 
(Ludhiana, 
Chandigarh) 
Focus group 
discussion, semi-
structured interview 
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2.2 Survey 
Design  
Themes identified from the exploratory research data were used to design the survey. Survey guidelines 
used were adopted from the data collection instrument developed and validated by Khera (2014). The 
survey was divided into five parts: (a) household demographics, (b) PDS attributes, (c) six-monthly system 
attributes, and (d) advantages and (e) disadvantages of the six-monthly system. Responses to the survey 
items were given on a seven-point Likert-type scale ranging from –3 (strongly disagree) to +3 (strongly 
agree) to appropriately collect variations in participant responses (Neuendorf, 2002). The survey 
questionnaire was validated using face validity, wherein the feedback from field experts was used to 
improve the existing design (Chopra, 2014; Grover et al., 2016; Neuendorf, 2002). The survey was also 
pretested among 15 beneficiaries before dissemination.  
Dissemination 
As noted earlier, the authors again visited Punjab from July to August in 2016 to conduct the survey 
among eligible beneficiary households. Based on inputs from the exploratory research, Ludhiana was 
selected for survey dissemination, as it is Punjab’s largest district with a population of 1.7 million, and 
with over 400,000 registered beneficiary households, has the highest number of FPSs (Economic & 
Statistical Organization, 2013). The authors knew the local language well, which made it convenient to 
identify and gain access to eligible beneficiary households.  
2.3 Participants 
The authors used snowball sampling to recruit beneficiary households and then identified beneficiaries 
with specific attributes (Creswell, 2009). Beneficiary households who had registered with PDS recently 
and had no prior experience with the once-monthly distribution system were not considered. Please refer 
Table 3 for characteristics of survey respondents. Identification of PDS-eligible households is a state 
prerogative, and the state of Punjab identified the following as eligible under the new atta-daal (wheat-
pulses) scheme: (a) households already identified under the Antyodaya Anna Yojna (AAY)
3
 scheme, (b) 
households already identified as BPL by latest census reports (BPL cards)
4
 or by the old state PDS scheme 
(blue cards), (c) households with a disabled head of family, (d) landless daily paid workers or a single 
widowed head of the family, (e) farmer households having less than 2.5 acres of land, and (f) households 
with a gross annual income of less than $896 (Dept. of Food Civil Supplies & Consumer Affairs, 2014a).  
                                                 
3
 The AAY scheme is sponsored by the government of India to support the poorest of the poor and was started 
in December 2000 (Ministry of Consumer Affairs, Food & Public Distribution, 2016). 
4
According to the directives of NFSA 2013 the state of Punjab categorized all beneficiary households, except 
AAY households, as priority households.  
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Table 3. 
Characteristics of the survey respondents and their households 
a
 Standard of living index was created by weighting ownership of assets as follows: 4 for a pucca home 
(permanent), 2 for a semi-pucca home (makeshift) and 0 for mud home; 4 for 5 or more acres of land, 3 for 2–
5 acres of land, 2 for up to 2 acres of land and 0 for no land; 4 for ownership of a four-wheel vehicle and 3 for 
ownership of two-wheel vehicle; see Khera (2011) for more details. 
Characteristic Number Percentage 
Age (years)    
    21–30  42 14.00 
    31–40  114 38.00 
    41–50  86 28.67 
    51–60  33 11.00 
    ≥61 25 8.34 
Gender   
    Male  102 34.00  
    Female 198 66.00 
Education   
    No education 79 26.33 
    ≤5
th
 grade 116 38.67 
    Secondary (10
th
 grade) 85 28.33 
    Higher secondary (12
th
 grade) 18 6.00 
    College 2 0.67 
Employment   
    Casual labor 143 47.67 
    Self-employed 61 20.34 
    Housewife 80 26.67  
Area   
    Rural 201 67.00  
    Urban 99 33.00  
Vehicle   
    None 8 2.67  
    Cycle 244 81.34  
    Motor cycle/scooter 206 68.67  
House type   
    Semi-pukka (makeshift) 179 59.67  
    Pukka (permanent) 116 38.67  
Size of agricultural land   
    None 245 81.67  
    < 2.5 acres 32 10.67 
    2.5 to 5 acres 23 7.67  
Head of family    
     Gender   
          Male 253 84.37  
          Female 46 15.34  
Average age (years) 53.13  
Average family size 4.86  
Standard of living index
a
   
   Low (<2) 152 50.67  
   Medium (2–6) 101 33.67  
   High (>6) 47 15.67  
Avg. distance from PDS outlet (miles) 0.89  
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2.4 Multiple Logistic Regression 
Different logistic regression models were developed to study facilitating, impeding , and demographic 
factors influencing the preference of beneficiary households toward the six-monthly distribution system. 
In this study, participants either preferred or did not prefer the six-monthly distribution system. So given 
a binary choice and computational convenience, logistic regression was an appropriate statistical tool 
(Greene, 2008; Long & Freese 2006; Tiwari et al., 2008). 
Empirical Modelling 
The authors followed a traditional approach of constructing the most parsimonious model as this helps in 
stabilizing the model numerically (Hosmer & Lemeshow, 2000). The model in terms of probability is 
specified as:  
  (1) 
where  is the probability of an event occurring for an observed set of variables , is the intercept 
term defined as the value of log odds of success when all  are 0,  are estimated 
parameters corresponding to each explanatory variable, and are explanatory variables. 
Given that  is the probability of a beneficiary preferring the six-monthly system, then  is the 
probability of not preferring the six-monthly system. The odds for preference are , and its 
log odds (i.e., logit) is y = . This transforms the nonlinear equation Eq. 1 into a linear 
equation Eq. 2. The dependent variable y was modeled as: y = preference for the six -monthly system. So 
p(y) = {1 if the households preferred the six-monthly system, and 0 otherwise}. Thus, the logistic 
prediction model (Agresti, 2007; Kabir et al., 2013) is specified as:  
  . (2) 
For the model with a two-group categorical explanatory variable  
 . 
First, the data were checked for multi-collinearity
5
; the variance inflation factor was less than 5 for the 
study. Variables were categorized as nominal or categorical depending upon the data. Data were also 
checked for outliers using box plots and residual statistics. A stepwise fit method was used for variable 
selection by applying mixed direction regression control. Finally , the model was checked for interactions, 
and a preliminary final model was generated (Hosmer & Lemeshow, 2000). 
The specified model was tested for different parameters (Hosmer & Lemeshow, 2000). First, the model 
was tested for the whole model, and second, R
2
 (U) also known as McFadden’s pseudo R
2
 was checked to 
verify the power of model in predicting the response variable. R
2
 values ranged from zero for no 
improvement to one for a perfect fit. Lastly, a lack-of-fit test (or goodness of fit) was used to estimate 
whether more complex terms needed to be added to the model. A significant lack-of-fit test result 
suggests the need for higher order terms or interaction terms.  
Variable Selection 
The state government suggested several benefits
6
 of the six-monthly distribution system for 
beneficiaries, as listed in Table 1. Beneficiaries reported several concerns with the system , as identified 
from the exploratory research data (see Table 4). Furthermore, a content analysis of the field notes also 
suggested several demographic factors that affected beneficiaries’ preferences (see Table 3). Therefore , 
based on the previously identified themes, the authors estimated three different logistic regression 
models: 
                                                 
5
 Multicollinearity for categorical variables can be verified using the phi coefficient or tetrachoric correlation 
(Ekstrom, n.d.). The authors verified multicollinearity for continuous variables only. 
6
Benefits for both the administration and beneficiaries are listed in Table 1, but only variables that are direct 
benefit to beneficiaries were considered for model development. 
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(a) facilitating variables (or benefits, as listed in Table 1), (b) impeding variables (or concerns, as listed in 
Table 4), and (c) demographic factors (as listed in Table 3). 
 
Table 4. 
Concerns of beneficiaries with six-monthly distribution system as observed by authors during the exploratory research 
Variables
a
 Concerns Anecdotal evidence
b
 
Storage Beneficiaries have to store 150 kg
c
 of grains for six months 
instead of 25 kg for a month. Don’t have proper storage bins 
and store rooms 
“we don’t have a pukka [permanent] 
house, where will we store [bulk] 
grains” (BY1)  
Transportation Beneficiaries have to transport 150 kg
c
 of grains from PDS 
outlet to respective storage places. Don’t have required 
vehicles 
 
“have a cycle. Generally have to hire a 
cart or rickshaw. With monthly 
distribution it was easy” (BY2) 
 
Preservation Beneficiaries have to preserve bulk grains from insects, 
pests, fungus etc. 
 
“I generally use neem [Indian lilac] 
leaves instead; cannot spend on 
expensive remedies [commercial 
insecticides]” (BY3) 
 
Cost Storage, transportation, preservation require additional 
logistical resources. Cost of grain management has increased 
 
“Government has transferred storage 
cost to us instead” (BY1) 
Timely distribution Distribution of grains is not timely and is irregular. 
Beneficiaries have to wait for more than six months to 
receive their entitlement 
 
“have not received grains from past 9 
months” (BY4) 
Long interval Six months is a long interval of time  e.g., distribution should be quarterly 
instead
d
 
 
One-time payment Beneficiaries have to pay for six months grains ($4.5)
c
 at 
once rather than monthly payments of $0.75 
 
“I am daily wage laborer; it’s difficult 
at times but manageable” (BY1) 
 
Grains traded 
 
Subsidized bulk grains have high market price and can be 
traded for some unwanted commodity by any family 
member leaving others vulnerable  
 
e.g., males could trade grains for 
money to buy alcohol 
Exploitation by 
middlemen 
 
With bulk distribution various middle men can exploit 
beneficiaries for money or in-kind benefits 
“FPS owner charges for wheat bag 
sometimes” (BY4) 
“[with no space] I store my grains with 
private flour mill personnel, he 
charges me for that” (BY1) 
 
Communication of 
stock arrival 
Communication of arrival of grains is not proper (1) Time 
between communication and arrival of grains is less to make 
arrangement for resources (2) If one misses the 
announcement it is tedious to get grains 
e.g., announcement should be made a 
week in advance through mobile 
messages or pamphlets
d
 
 
PDS outlet distance 
 
PDS outlet or common site of distribution is further away 
from beneficiary’s house than the FPS 
 
 
Inaccessible for 
females 
 
Since this involves (1) transporting and lifting of 150 kg 
grains, (2) distribution happens at common sites and (3) 
higher sum of money is involved – it might become difficult 
for females to participate 
 
 
a
 Variables as identified by using thematic coding on exploratory research data 
b
 BY - Beneficiary (where 1, 2, 3… are the codes for different beneficiaries) 
c
 Calculations based on average family size of five members 
d
 Author’s observations from exploratory research or literature review 
 
Abhay Grover and Shweta Chopra/ Int. J. Food System Dynamics 8 (4), 2017, 298-316 
308 
3 Results 
As discussed earlier, three sets of regression were carried out. The whole model test was statistically 
significant at p = 0.05 for all three models. Mc-Fadden’s pseudo R
2
 values were between 0.2 and 0.4, 
indicating good fit and predictive ability for all models (Clark & Hosking, 1986; Domencich & McFadden, 
1975). The lack–of-fit test was not significant for facilitating and impeding models but was significant for 
the model containing demographic variables, indicating the need for interaction terms. Two-way 
interaction terms were added to the model for goodness of fit (Hosmer & Lemeshow, 2000). Overall 
results provided adequate support for reliability, predictive power, and goodness of fit for all three 
models.  
After a step-wise selection procedure was applied on all facilitating variables listed in Table 1, only  
important variables were retained on the basis of significance. Refer to Table 5 for the list of variables 
included in the model. Out of these, only the variables “hassle” and “leakages” were significant at  p = 
0.01. The significant explanatory variable hassle had a coefficient estimate of 0.81 and exponent value of 
2.24. This suggests that, if all other explanatory variables held constant, the odds of preferring six-
monthly system when the beneficiaries perceived that hassle had decreased with the system was 2.24 
times or 124 percent of the odds of preferring the six-monthly system when they perceived that hassle 
had not decreased. The other variable, leakages, was interpreted in the same way. These results suggest 
that hassle and leakages significantly affected beneficiaries’ preference for the six-monthly system, and 
as the perception of these variables decreased in the system, beneficiaries were more likely to prefer the 
six-monthly system. 
Table 5. 
Facilitating factors regressed on the preference of beneficiary for six-monthly distribution system
a
 (N = 160) 
Note: Whole model test: –log likelihood difference = 23.00, chi square = 46.00, prob>chisq < 0.0001; lack of fit (–log 
likelihood difference = 23.92, chi-square = 47.83, prob>chisq 0.09.  
a
 Preference for six-monthly system = 1 if respondents preferred the six-monthly distribution system over the monthly 
system, otherwise = 0; hassle = 1 if the six-monthly system was less bothersome as compared to regular monthly visits, 
otherwise = 0; leakages = 1 if respondents believed that leakages had decreased with the six-monthly system as compared 
with monthly system, otherwise = 0. 
b 
As per definition, consumer empowerment (Table 1) was further categorized into two variables: (a) independence to 
manage grains and (b) FPS dependence. 
*** p = .01. 
Variables Estimate Exponents Standard error Chi-square Prob>chisq 
Quantity 
 
0.07 1.08 0.29 0.07 0.80 
Quality 
 
0.24 1.27 0.28 0.72 0.40 
Hassle 
 
0.81 2.24 0.30 7.31 0.007*** 
Independence to 
manage grains
b 
 
0.59 1.81 0.43 1.93 0.17 
Delivery 
mechanism 
 
0.09 1.09 0.22 0.16 0.70 
Leakages 
 
1.10 2.99 0.28 15.19 <0.0001*** 
PDS 
performance 
 
0.08 1.08 0.27 0.77 0.77 
FPS dependence
b
 
 
–0.30 0.78 0.55 0.21 0.65 
Intercept 
 
–0.13 0.88 0.41  0.75 
McFadden’s 
pseudo R
2
 
 
0.22     
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Similarly, a step-wise selection procedure was applied on all the impeding variables listed in Table 4. All 
variables included in the model are listed in Table 6. All the variables, except for “timely distribution” and 
“PDS outlet distance,” were significant at p = 0.05. The significant explanatory variable “storage” had a 
coefficient estimate of 0.80 and an exponent of 2.23, which suggests that, if all other explanatory 
variables held constant, the odds of preferring the six-monthly system when the beneficiaries perceived 
that storage was not a challenge was 2.314 times or 131.4 percent of the odds of preferring the system 
when they perceived that storage was a challenge. The other significant variables were interpreted in a 
similar way. These results suggest that if beneficiaries perceived that “storage” and “one-time payment” 
were challenges, they were less likely to prefer the six-monthly system. Similarly, if they believed that six 
months is a long time interval between grain distributions, that in the six-monthly system bulk grains are 
more likely to be traded by their family members, that they are more vulnerable to getting exploited by 
middlemen, or that communication of stock arrival is not proper, they were less likely to prefer the six-
monthly system. These factors significantly impacted beneficiaries’ preference for the six-monthly 
system. 
Table 6. 
Impeding factors regressed on the preference of beneficiary for the six-monthly distribution system
 a 
(N = 195) 
Note: Whole model test: –log likelihood difference = 30.85, chi-square = 61.69, prob>chisq < 0.0001; lack of fit: –log 
likelihood difference = 26.00, chi-square = 52.00, prob>chisq < 0.065.  
a
 Preference for six-monthly system = 1 if respondents preferred the six-monthly distribution system over the monthly 
system, otherwise = 0; storage = 1 if respondents believed that storage of bulk grains in the six-monthly system was not a 
challenge, otherwise = 0; long interval = 1 if respondents believed that six months was not a long time interval for grain 
distribution, otherwise = 0; one-time payment = 1 if respondents believed that a one-time payment during the six-monthly 
system was not a challenge, otherwise = 0; grain traded = 1 if respondents believed that bulk grains would not get traded 
by him/her or any member of his/her family, otherwise = 0; exploitation by middlemen = 1 if respondents believed that 
with six-monthly distribution system they didn’t fear exploitation by middle men, otherwise = 0; Communication of stock 
arrival = 1 if respondents believed that communication regarding arrival of grains was proper with six-monthly system, 
otherwise = 0. 
b
 Based on language of the question and beneficiary response these variables were reverse coded to fit the model  
** p = .05, ***p = .01. 
 
Furthermore, a step-wise selection procedure was also performed on all demographic variables , as listed 
in Table 3. All variables included in the model are listed in Table 7. Test statistics from the regression run 
on suggested variables indicated the need for two-way interaction terms. The gender, area, and 
employment variables were significant at p = 0.05. The significant explanatory variable gender had a 
coefficient estimate of –0.53 and an exponent of 0.59, which suggests that if all other explanatory 
Variables Estimate Exponents Standard error Chi-square Prob>chiSq 
Storage 0.80 2.23 0.31 6.68 0.010*** 
Timely distribution 0.32 1.37 0.27 1.36 0.24 
Long interval 0.88 2.42 0.43 4.33 0.037** 
One-time payment 0.37 1.45 0.18 4.37 0.037** 
Grains traded
b
 
 
1.07 2.91 0.40 7.08 0.008*** 
Exploitation by 
middlemen
b
 
 
1.09 2.97 0.35 9.87 0.002*** 
PDS outlet distance 0.62 1.85 0.45 1.84 0.17 
Communication of 
stock arrival 
 
0.59 1.80 0.19 9.94 0.002*** 
Intercept -1.70 0.18 0.57  0.003*** 
McFadden’s 
pseudo R
2
 
 
0.23     
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variables held constant, the odds of preferring the six-monthly system decreased by 41.2 percent 
between males and females, or with all other explanatory variables held constant, the odds of females 
choosing the six-monthly program were 0.59 times the odds of males of choosing the six-monthly 
program. The other significant variables of area and employment were interpreted in a similar way. These 
results suggest that females, beneficiaries from rural areas, and housewives are less likely to prefer the 
six-monthly system as compared to males, beneficiaries from urban areas, and beneficiaries employed as 
casual labors, respectively. Therefore gender, area, and employment significantly impact beneficiaries’ 
preference for the six-monthly system. 
Table 7. 
Demographic factors regressed on the preference of beneficiary for six-monthly distribution system (N = 271) 
Note: Whole model test: –log likelihood difference = 45.91, chi-square = 91.82, prob>chisq < 0.0001; lack of fit: –log 
likelihood difference = 130.35, chi-square = 260.70, prob>chisq < 0.23).  
a
 Categorical variables with base category in brackets. 
b 
Employment was categorized into casual labor and housewives; data for self-employed were either excluded or included 
case by case within the two categories. 
c 
Significant interactions, e.g., gender[Female] * education suggests that the slope for males and females are significantly 
different from each other given years of schooling vs. log odds of success. To make any interpretation for interaction terms 
we needed to account for individual variables as well. Different significance tests can be performed, but this is beyond the 
scope of this paper. 
** p = .05, ***p = .01. 
To further evaluate the performance of six-monthly system, the authors analyzed all the significant 
Variables Estimate Exponents Standard error Chi-square Prob>chiSq 
Age 
 
0.00 1.00 0.03 0.00 0.94 
Gender[Female]
a
 
 
-0.53 0.59 0.24 5.02 0.03** 
Area[Rural]
a
 
 
-3.51 0.03 0.96 13.32 0.0003*** 
Head of Family[Female]
a
 
 
0.16 1.18 0.33 0.25 0.62 
SLI 
 
-0.38 0.68 0.20 3.72 0.05 
Experience with six-monthly 
system 
 
0.04 1.04 0.03 1.52 0.22 
Education 
 
0.11 1.11 0.08 1.88 0.17 
Employment[Casual labor]
a, b
 
 
0.88 2.41 0.34 6.82 0.009*** 
Age*Area[Rural]  
 
-0.04 0.96 0.03 2.55 0.11 
Gender[Female]*SLI  
 
-0.21 0.81 0.13 2.55 0.11 
Gender[Female]*experience  
with six-monthly system 
 
0.05 1.05 0.03 2.3 0.13 
Gender[Female]*education
c
 
 
-0.10 0.90 0.03 8.92 0.003*** 
Area[Rural]*SLI 
 
0.38 1.45 0.21 3.19 0.07 
Area[Rural]*education
c
 
 
-0.22 0.80 0.08 8.01 0.005*** 
Head of 
Family[Female]*employment 
 
0.55 1.73 0.33 2.76 0.10 
Intercept 
 
3.73  1.62 5.27 0.02** 
McFadden’s pseudo R
2
 
 
0.25     
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variables identified above using a one-sample Wilcoxon signed rank test
7
 (refer to Table 8) (Robbins, 
2010). The distribution of all individual responses on a Likert-type scale ranging from –3 to +3 for a single 
variable was tested around zero. The results indicated that beneficiaries perceived that hassle and 
leakages decreased with the introduction of the six-monthly system. They believed that the variables of 
storage of bulk grains, grains being traded by family members, exploitation by middlemen, and 
communication were not concerns with the six-monthly system. But they also believed that six months is 
a “long interval” of time between grain distributions and that a “one-time payment” was a challenge for 
them. Furthermore, there was insufficient evidence to conclude whether the beneficiaries preferred 
either a one- or six-monthly system over the other. 
Table 8. 
Distribution of individual significant variables around zero on a Likert-type scale ranging from –3 to +3 
Variables Estimated mean  Standard 
deviation 
Wilcoxon signed rank  
test statistic 
Prob 
Hassle 
 
1.26 1.18 17554.50 <0.0001*** 
Leakages 
 
0.32 1.27 6621.00 <0.0001*** 
Storage 
 
–0.80 1.65 –11561.00 <0.0001*** 
Long interval 
 
1.29 1.68 17707.00 <0.0001*** 
One-time payment 0.35 0.68 3981.50 <0.0030*** 
Grains traded –1.40 1.30 –17320.00 <0.0001*** 
Exploitation by 
middlemen  
 
–1.08 1.48 –15338.0 <0.0001*** 
Communication of 
stock arrival 
 
–0.95 1.53 –13890.0 <0.0001*** 
Preference for six-
monthly system 
0.25 1.91 2103.50 0.07 
***p = .01. 
4 Discussion 
Our findings suggest that of all the benefits claimed by the state government and policymakers (refer 
Table 1), beneficiaries’ preference for the six-monthly system is strongly influenced by decreased hassle 
and decreased leakages in the system. These two facilitating factors identified in this study are consistent 
with the observations of Gaikwad (2010), Kumar (2015), and Puri (2014). The statistical significance of 
hassle variable strongly indicates that going to FPS on a monthly basis is not convenient for beneficiaries 
and that they prefer procuring their grains at longer time intervals. This might also suggest that 
beneficiaries do not enjoy their service experience with PDS and its stakeholders. About 53 percent of the 
beneficiaries reported spending more than two hours to procure their grains and about 48 percent 
reported being hourly employees or casual laborers, which might have made it more difficult to engage 
with the system frequently and might have affected their perception of service quality. Therefore, 
distribution at a longer interval, such as six months, would result in increased consumer satisfaction, as it 
would save consumers a lot of otherwise productive time, allowing them to better concentrate on their 
employment or other welfare activities (Gaikwad, 2010; Kumar, 2015). Moreover, because public services 
function as monopolies, policymakers tend to ignore the importance of customer satisfaction in policy 
implementation (Andreassen, 1994). Our findings suggest that beneficiaries are rational consumers with 
preferences, expectations, and constraints, and they often make informed choices to maximize utility 
                                                 
7This is a nonparametric test used for an individual samples when the data are not normally distributed 
(Robbins, 2010). The null hypothesis is that the distribution is centered around zero on a Likert-type scale, 
whereas the alternate hypothesis is otherwise. 
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from the system. Their choice to productively participate in the system can make such policy initiatives 
very successful. Thus, a significant policy implication of the research findings is to integrate consumer 
satisfaction as an important performance indicator for such developmental policies. 
Likewise, the current framework of the six-monthly distribution system increases the transparency within 
the system with the improved community distribution mechanism. Delivery of grains takes place at 
common sites such as local temples or playgrounds. So instead of interacting on an individual basis with 
FPS representatives, beneficiaries receive grains in front of other beneficiaries under direct supervision of 
food inspectors. Gaikwad (2010) suggested that this would decrease organized black marketing by 
middlemen, as the system would have increased monitoring by the government and beneficiaries. The 
decrease of leakages would have a direct positive impact on the quantity of grains being delivered to 
beneficiaries, improving their consumption pattern as well (Kishore & Chakrabarti, 2015; Rahman, 2016). 
So, our findings suggest that a perception of a decrease in leakages in the system translates into 
beneficiaries having more trust in the six-monthly distribution system; thus, beneficiaries’ preference for 
the policy greatly depends on their perception about the improvement in the system’s efficiency 
(Ramaswami & Balakrishnan, 2002). Furthermore, the trust established can increase beneficiaries’ 
willingness to accept the changes proposed by the new scheme and become a part of its successful 
implementation. Therefore, “trust in the system” should also be used as an important performance 
indicator for developmental policies in general.  
Our research also identified that the variables of storage, interval of grain distribution, one-time 
payment, grains trade, exploitation by middlemen, and time between the communication and actual 
distribution of grains significantly influenced beneficiaries’ preference for the six-monthly distribution 
system. Though beneficiaries strongly suggested that storage was not a concern, it could significantly 
impact their preferences, which contradicts Gaikwad’s (2010) observations. Our results suggest that if 
beneficiaries believe that storage is a concern, they are less likely to adopt the six-monthly distribution 
system; in fact, 60 percent of beneficiaries stay in temporary or make-shift houses, so storing additional 
grains is a challenge for them. Further, Nayar (2015) and Sharma and Chandrasekhar (2016) suggested 
that beneficiaries either remain on the move or frequently migrate in search of stable jobs, which makes 
handling storage for six months impractical. Additionally, all the beneficiaries were earning less than $896 
per annum, and proper storage of bulk grains requires new infrastructural investments such as bins, bags, 
or silos.  
In terms of grain distribution interval, if the beneficiaries perceived that six months was a long interval of 
time, they were less likely to adopt the system. Our findings suggest that beneficiaries strongly believed 
that six months is a long interval of time for grain distribution, even more so because, on most occasions, 
the beneficiaries reported receiving grains after eight or nine months instead of six months. Moreover, 
about 82 percent of the households reported consuming their six-month entitlement in less than four 
months, leaving them with no food. Therefore, most of them believed that a longer interval would lead to 
an even greater gap between distributions, leaving them more vulnerable. At the same time, they did not 
want to engage with the system as frequently as on a monthly basis. Thus, if the system could efficiently 
deliver grains to them on a fixed pre-determined date on a six-monthly basis, most of beneficiaries might 
not have been as apprehensive about the distribution interval. Delivering as committed would increase 
customer trust and satisfaction with the system. 
One-time payment is a critical factor because most of the beneficiaries were earning less than $2.50 per 
day. During the monthly system, payment for grains was distributed equally over 12 months, but with the 
six-monthly system, beneficiaries have to pay for six months at one time. More so, about 65 percent of 
beneficiaries reported having no formal education, which can make planning finances a challenge. 
Another related factor is the amount of time between communication of the arrival and actual 
distribution of grains. There is no fixed date of distribution, and the communication about distribution is 
received about 12 hours before the actual arrival of grains. About one third of respondents reported 
dissatisfaction with the time frame and found it difficult to arrange for money and other resources for 
procurement. Hence, the uncertainty in the grain distribution drastically impacted beneficiaries’ 
preference. Also, beneficiaries believed that grain trade by family members and exploitation by 
middlemen were not a concern for them in the present system. However, they also believed that if this 
were to happen it would strongly influence their preference for the system.  
Furthermore, our research identified several demographic factors, such as gender, area, and employment 
that significantly impacted beneficiaries’ preference for the six-monthly system. Several researchers, such 
as Abebe et al. (2013) and Khera (2014), have identified similar demographic factors influencing policy 
adoption under different scenarios. Our findings suggest that females are less likely to prefer the six-
monthly system as compared to male household members. Moreover, when the pattern of household 
Abhay Grover and Shweta Chopra/ Int. J. Food System Dynamics 8 (4), 2017, 298-316 
313 
members participating in PDS prior to the six-monthly system was compared with the existing scenario it 
was found that the female engagement had decreased by about 54 percent. This may be because about 
40 percent of the female respondents were housewives, who traditionally do not contribute directly 
toward household income (Rao, 2006); therefore, the six-monthly system decreases their overall control 
in planning for household food security and with less financial independence, it might be more 
convenient for them to procure the grains on a monthly basis. Additionally , 65 percent of female 
respondents had no formal education, which may make understanding and adopting the new system a 
challenge.  
Contrary to Gaikwad’s (2010) study, our results suggest that beneficiaries in rural areas are less likely to 
adopt the six-monthly system as compared to urban beneficiaries. Because Gaikwad’s (2010) study was 
based in Maharashtra, where villages are not accessible by road and the average distance to market is 9–
12 miles, the six-monthly system is more favorable for beneficiaries. However, the average distance to 
market in rural Punjab is 0.89 miles, indicating that access to the market is more convenient. The 
logistical resources, such as transportation, in urban areas are more costly than in rural areas. Moreover, 
employment patterns such as organized labor are different in urban as compared to rural areas (Sharma 
& Chandrasekhar, 2016). Our results suggest that employment in general affects beneficiaries’ preference 
for the six-monthly system. Casual laborer or daily wage workers are more likely to prefer the six-monthly 
system as compared to beneficiaries who are not employed. The respondents with no empl oyment are 
mostly housewives, as discussed before.  
Study limitations and future work 
We caution against generalizing the findings beyond the sites studied because of the substantial 
differences likely to exist between sites within Punjab and in other Indian states and beyond. This 
research was focused on just one aspect of the new atta-daal (wheat-pulses) scheme. The impacts of 
digitization of identification cards and of females being declared as the head of family still need further 
investigation. A survey of policymakers, FPS owners, FCI officials, and commission agents can add breadth 
to the research. Moreover, the data were collected after 18 months of the implementation of the policy 
(from July 2015 to August 2016). With new policy adoption, the initial few years are the “infant” or early 
acceptance stage during which the beneficiaries experience several “teething” issues. 
Future work on this research may include an increased sample size spread across several districts. The 
effects of the identified factors (demographic, facilitating, impeding) need to be further studied to better 
understand the mechanism and the underlying reasons for them. Structure equation modelling and factor 
analysis may be used for understanding individual factors and the degree of influence of each variable. A 
techno-economic analysis of the six-monthly supply chain may yield a cost–benefit ratio and help better 
understand policy implementation. This would be critical to weigh ing the sustainability of the policy in 
the long term.  
5 Policy Implications and Conclusion 
This research identified facilitating, impeding, and demographic factors that affect beneficiaries’ 
preference for the six-monthly distribution system and also evaluated performance of the new system 
based on these identified factors. Further, we provided policy implications relative to the state and 
district under consideration. Findings of this research will be significant for other districts and states that 
run similar public food distribution systems. 
Some of the important policy implications limited to the district under consideration and the state of 
Punjab are that (a) such interventions should not undermine the status of beneficiaries as rational 
consumers, and policymakers should realize the importance of consumer satisfaction in successful 
implementation of similar developmental policies; (2) beneficiaries’ trust in the system defines their 
willingness to accept the policy interventions and participate to make it successful; delivering on 
commitments by the administration can help strengthen beneficiaries’ trust in the system; and (3) 
communication with beneficiaries and other stakeholders regarding new developments is critical for 
policy’s success; ambiguity and uncertainty due to lack of transparency can be detr imental to such policy 
interventions (Schiefer & Deiters, 2015). 
Specifically for the six-monthly distribution system in the district of Ludhiana, it is recommended that (a) 
beneficiary trust and satisfaction should be made key policy performance indicator s; (b) the government 
should provide logistical support to beneficiaries in form of bins or hermetic storages such as PICS 
(Purdue improved cowpea storage) bags for storing six-month entitlements; (c) the option of a cash 
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advance for monetary resilience of beneficiaries via FPS would be very useful; (d) because promoting 
females as head of the families is one of the primary objective of new atta-daal (wheat-pulses) scheme 
under NFSA 2013, gender-based incentives for females can increase their engagement with the system; 
(e) distribution of grains should happen on fixed pre-determined dates communicated well in advance; 
the state should make every effort to deliver grains on time; and (f) finally, this scheme should be 
implemented with an option to revert back to a monthly distribution system when desired by 
beneficiaries, and this should be clearly communicated to them.  
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